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Introduction
The logic of testing theories that posit causal complexity, or multiple causal paths, has so far been given short shrift in large-N studies of politics. Such theories are both common and prominent in the political science literature. In qualitative research, the concept of complexity and the methodological problems that it poses have been understood for some time.
1 Formal mathematical models, too, often imply Boolean hypotheses; although the terms "causal complexity" and "multiple causal paths" are rarely used to describe them, the basic logic is no different.
To date, however, no one has made a concerted effort to describe how the empirical implications of theoretical models that posit causal complexity could be captured by statistical methods. While occasional quick fixes (e.g., multiplication of independent variables) demonstrate that there is at least an awareness that standard statistical procedures are lacking, no methodology has been specifically tailored to incorporate the logic of complexity.
This paper proposes a remedy. In the following pages I elaborate the concept of causal complexity and demonstrate the breadth of its applicability by discussing prominent research traditions that incorporate its logic. The number and prominence of the theories that hypothesize causal complexity demonstrates that the development of a statistical method appropriate for complexity is a matter of great importance.
I then derive new econometric techniques, Boolean probit and logit, that are designed specifically for use as a test of theories that posit multiple paths to a given (non-)outcome.
2 They provide an answer to a long-standing puzzle in the international relations literature: while IR theorists often posit that conflict occurs when at least one state has the capabilities and willingness to initiate it, and the findings of qualitative studies usually support this conclusion, quantitative studies often do not. A re-examination of some of the literature's most recent findings using the technique described herein both confirms the intuition that capabilities and willingness produce conflict and demonstrates that willingness can stem from multiple, independent sources.
More broadly, the solution proposed here represents an attempt to overcome the widespread perception that quantitative and qualitative research must proceed from fundamentally different ontological foundations. Quantitative researchers are often skeptical regarding the utility and applicability of such baroque concepts as causal complexity, INUS conditions, and the like, and qualitative (and formal) researchers accuse their large-N colleagues of being too wedded to additive, linear-in-variable formulations that constitute prosaic models of causation. Too often the result is a "separate but equal" policy. This article seeks genuine accommodation.
Causal Complexity
Concrete definitions of causal complexity are difficult to come by, perhaps because the concept is so slippery.
3 Jervis (1997, 35 ) describes a situation in which "the effect of one variable or characteristic can depend on which others are present." Ragin (1987, 20) refers to cases in which "an outcome results from several different combinations of conditions."
Ragin's solution to the problem of dealing with causal complexity, qualitative comparative analysis, is of necessity more concrete, and examining its workings reveals the essence of causal complexity: multiple causes interact with one another to produce effects, and the manner in which they interact is described by the logical operators "and" and "or" (89-93) . For example, Ragin describes the mobilization of ethnic groups as being the result of either large size and economic advance or a strong linguistic base and high relative wealth (142) (143) .
This formulation reveals an interesting point: many diverse concepts can be understood as special cases of causal complexity. They include:
• Multiple conjunctural causation: X 1 and X 2 and X 3 produce Y (Ragin 1987 ).
• Substitutability: X 1 or X 2 or X 3 produces Y (Most and Starr 1984; CioffiRevilla and Starr 1995) .
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• Contexts: X 2 produces Y , but only in the presence of X 1 (Goertz 1994 ).
• Necessary and sufficient conditions: X 1 and X 2 produce Y , X 1 or X 2 produces Y (Dion 1998; Braumoeller and Goertz 2000) .
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• INUS conditions: 6 (X 1 and X 2 ) or (X 3 and X 4 ) produce Y (Mackie 1965) .
3 In systems theory, this topic goes by the name of "equifinality," a property present in any system in which similar ends can be achieved via different means. In the social science literature, this term is sometimes used (see, e.g., Bennett and George (1997) ), though "causal complexity" is more common. The philosophy of science literature refers to "causal chains" or "causal ropes," both of which have a prominent and well-established lineage dating back at least to Venn (1866) . I find the analogy of causal strands appealing but prefer to take no position on the "chains vs. ropes" (that is, continuous vs. discrete causation) debate; hence paths.
4 See also the February, 2000 special issue of the Journal of Conflict Resolution (44:1) devoted to substitutability in foreign policy.
5 Typical formulations would suggest that necessary and sufficient conditions are not statistical problems because they admit no counterexamples and that, as a result, the statistical procedure described hereinafter is inapplicable; Braumoeller and Goertz (2000, 848) outline four reasons to expect otherwise. 6 Mackie coined this term as a definition of a cause; it refers to "an insufficient but necessary part of a condition which is itself unnnecessary but sufficient for the result" (245, emphasis in original). In the above example, X 1 -X 4 are all INUS conditions. I am indebted to Catharina Wrede Braden for goading me into thinking about how such conditions could be captured by the techniques described below.
Complex causation is problematic for the vast majority of existing statistical techniques. The problem is that complexity implies a particular form of nonadditivity that arises from the nature of the cumulation of the impact of the independent variables on the dependent variable: the presence or absence of one independent variable mitigates-or in the extreme, nullifies-the impact of another.
There are some exceptions to this generalization, but very few. 7 In the context of basic random utility models, 8 Achen (2002, 439) notes that power logit (Prentice 1976 ) is implied whenever each of a given number of distinct, equiprobable conditions is necessary for an outcome, and scobit (Nagler 1994) is implied whenever each of a given number of distinct, equiprobable conditions is sufficient for an outcome. The advantages of Boolean probit or logit over either power logit or scobit in modeling complexity in random utility models are twofold: first, they permit the researcher to model combinations of Boolean conditions, and second, the extremely restrictive assumption that each of the conditions is equiprobable is relaxed.
In order to understand the advantages of the technique fully, of course, it must first be derived, which requires a more thorough understanding of complex causation. Conjunctural causation and substitutability are the fundamental building blocks of complexity, so I will begin by examining their logic.
The logic of complexity
In the case of substitutability, the marginal impact of a change in one independent variable on the probability that the dependent variable will occur decreases as the level of the other independent variables increase (and vice-versa). To take a few examples: Thomas Schelling pointed out that either a strong deterrent or a strong defense could prevent war (1966, 78) ; John Mueller claims that either nuclear weapons or the lessons of World War II would have produced stability during the Cold War (and hence that nuclear weapons were "essentially irrelevant"-1988, 58); and James Morrow posits that pursuit of either autonomy goals or security goals can lead to the decision to seek an alliance (1991, 905) . The literature on war in particular is replete with substitutable 7 The situation envisioned-the (non)occurrence of a particular event-is quite general, in the hopes that the technique used to model it will be useful to a broad audience. Techniques designed for more specific applications exist elsewhere. For example, Western (1998) applies a Bayesian hierarchical model to situations in which the effects of independent variables differ across countries in a pooled cross-sectional time-series study. Manton, Tolley, and Poss (1976) and Manton, Stallard, and Tolley (1991) utilize a methodology appropriate for multiple causes of human mortality. The application is interesting but the methodology does not generalize particularly well. One of its core assumptions (humans must eventually die, one way or another) is far too restrictive for the study of most political phenomena: dyads may or may not eventually go to war, states may or may not democratize, citizens may or may not revolt, etc.
8 A random utility model is one in which an actor's utility is hypothesized to depend on a set of known components, captured by the independent variables in the model, as well as on a large number of small and unrelated unknown components, which by virtue of the Central Limit Theorem will tend to sum to a normally-distributed error term.
causes, including competition, diffidence, or the desire for glory (Hobbes 1651, 70) ; miscalculation or loss of control (Levy 1983, 86) ; incentives to misrepresent capabilities and resolve or inability to commit credibly to an agreement (Fearon 1995) ; and the host of scenarios listed chapter by chapter ("War as an Accident," "Death-Watch and Scapegoat Wars," etc.) in Blainey (1973) .
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What all of these examples have in common is that, as X 1 increases, variation in X n (n = 1) has a decreasing impact on Y . In Mueller's case, for example, as the lessons of World War II become increasingly compelling, war among the Great Powers becomes increasingly unlikely and variation in ownership of nuclear weapons has a decreasing impact on peace.
10 The relationship among the independent variables is not additive, so these expectations are at best only approximated by an additive model.
The converse of this scenario is a situation in which only the combination of X 1 and X 2 is believed to have a causal impact on Y -that is, there are multiple paths to the nonoccurrence of the dependent variable. For example, Matthew Evangelista has demonstrated that transnational relations and domestic political structures combined to produce security policy in Russia and the Soviet Union. Change required both a domestic "window of opportunity" and transnational policy entrepreneurs willing to jump through it.
11 Other prominent examples include the "democratic peace" proposition (the assertion that high levels of democracy in both i and j produce peace between the two; see e.g. Doyle (1983a Doyle ( , 1983b ) and Arthur Lupia and Kaare Strom's finding that coalition dissolution can be expected only in the presence of a critical event, a majority preference for an election over the status quo, and a universal preference for election over "best offer" (Lupia and Strom 1995, 655) .
In each of these cases, the impact of changes in X 1 on Y depends on X 2 and vice-versa. Absent one factor, changes in the other have no impact. In the case of Evangelista's argument, two paths to nonoccurrence of policy change were present: either the absence of a window or the absence of an entrepreneur would have precluded it. Here, again, additivity is a nonsensical assumption. The assumption of additivity, therefore, does not always (or perhaps even usually) reflect the manner in which we and our theories envision the process of 9 Jim Morrow (personal communication) has called into question the meaningfulness of the concept of substitutability by pointing out that events with different sets of causes are often in the end classified as different types of events, in the same way that (for example) snakes and legless lizards are now classified as separate animals because of their distinct evolutionary origins. The caveat is worth noting, though my own belief is that, in political science, wars and revolutions and votes will continue to be seen as similar enough to be studied in the aggregate even if they are found to have multiple sources. In any event, whether or not some sets of events are eventually broken up into more meaningful subsets, I find it difficult to conclude, a priori, that all will be. That said, I should also note that the econometric difficulties posed by substitutability disappear if the different "paths" to a given outcome do produce qualitatively different kinds of phenomena that can be separated empirically and analyzed separately.
10 It should be noted that, logically, the converse should be true as well: in the presence of nuclear weapons, the lessons of World War II are, or were, irrelevant.
11 Evangelista (1995) . The origins of the entrepreneur-window analogy are akin to those of the Folk Theorem in game theory: it seems that everyone who uses it can cite an earlier usage. 
American Politics
High levels of political information or centrality of groups qua groups as objects in belief systems
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causation.
12 Regardless of which type of complexity is in the offing, the effects of the independent variables on the dependent variable, though cumulative, are simply not additive.
Moreover, theories that incorporate causal complexity are quite common. Tables 1 and 2 summarize the hypotheses listed above as well as others. The tables demonstrate that theories that posit causal complexity can be found throughout the discipline. The three main empirical subfields are all represented. The citations span nearly three and a half centuries. The hypotheses are derived from both verbal and mathematical theories, and they are examined in both case studies and large-N research. Further examples could be listed, but to do so would merely belabor the point: complexity pervades theorizing in political science.
A Solution
The solution I propose to the problem of statistical estimation in the presence of complexity flows directly from the logics of conjunctural causation and substitutability. I will begin by discussing hypothetical examples of both forms of complexity in which the values of the independent variables correspond directly to probabilities and no statistical estimation is necessary; the point will be to make the logic of such situations as clear as possible. I will then generalize to the sorts of independent variables to which social science researchers have become accustomed-i.e., those with values that do not correspond directly to known probabilities, making the estimation of coefficients necessary. I will model these probabilities as points somewhere along a cumulative normal curve [denoted by Φ(·)], let the location of the points be determined by the independent variables (X), their coefficients (β), and a constant term (α), calculate the dependent variable (Y ) as a function of those estimated probabilities, and utilize maximum likelihood estimation to obtain parameter estimates.
13 The result will be a new technique-Boolean probit-appropriate for use in testing theories that posit causal complexity.
It would also be possible to combine logit rather than probit curves, simply by replacing Φ(·) with
1+e (·) . In fact, I utilize Boolean logit in the re-analysis below. The probit notation is somewhat more compact, however, so I use it in the derivation that follows for the sake of clarity.
Following the derivation, I demonstrate the strengths and weaknesses of the Boolean probit and logit procedures in the context of empirical analysis. The main strengths that will be demonstrated are that the procedures provide a way for statistical modelers to test theories that posit even fairly convoluted forms of complexity; that they correctly model causal processes of interest, and in so doing report findings that might very well have been missed by existing techniques; and that they provide a vehicle for theoretical synthesis. There are also two drawbacks, both pertaining to the shape of the likelihood function to be maximized. The first is that complex multidimensional analyses of this sort occasionally produce convoluted likelihood functions with multiple maxima, so care must be taken to ensure that the maximum eventually reached is global rather than local. The second is that multidimensional analyses in general have more complex and rather demanding data requirements; the absence of sufficient information can produce plateaus in the likelihood function, rendering estimates of a particular coefficient essentially useless. Neither of these problems is unique to these procedures, of course, but they can be expected to crop up more often than they would in standard logit and probit analyses.
Conjunctural causation
In order to model a process of conjunctural causation we need: 1. to model the probabilities that each of the relevant causal factors will occur and then 2. to multiply those probabilities together to obtain the overall probability that the event in question will occur.
To provide the intuition behind this point, consider a brief example. Imagine that Rosencrantz, a piano mover by profession, picks his lunch at random on his way out the door in the morning from a box containing two sausages and one banana. Once at work, he selects a coil of rope, again at random, from a room containing three ropes, one of which is frayed. By noon, Rosencrantz has hoisted the piano up six stories, at which point he takes a break to eat lunch. If he has brought a banana for lunch, he drops the peel, and Guildenstern, an innocent pedestrian, slips on it and falls, landing directly beneath the piano. If Rosencrantz has chosen the frayed rope, the rope breaks and the piano falls to the ground. If (and only if) both of these events occur, Guildenstern is killed. This is an example of conjunctural causation. If the piano does not fall, Guildenstern will survive. Similarly, if Guildenstern does not slip on the peel, he will be clear of the piano when it lands and will not be injured. In combination, however, the two events produce an effect that the sum of their individual inputs would not suggest. Elementary calculations give us the probability that both events will occur, assuming that they are independent of one another:
Put intuitively, three choices of lunch and three choices of rope produce nine scenarios, only one of which (banana and frayed rope) is fatal to Guildenstern.
If we use p y to denote the outcome, p x1 to denote the probability that the first prerequisite will occur, and p x2 to denote the probability that the second prerequisite will occur, the general form for calculating the probability that a process of conjunctural causation will produce an outcome is simply
Converting this theoretical expectation into an econometric model suitable for estimation requires two steps. The first is to model the probability p xj that each of the prerequisites will occur as a function of a constant (α j ), the relevant independent variable (X j ), and its parameter (β j ), where the j subscript distinguishes among different causal paths. I will utilize the standard normal cumulative distribution function Φ(·) for this purpose.
14 The second is to model the probability that the outcome in question will occur in the ith observation as the product of the probabilities that each of its prerequisites will occur, so:
Generalizing to J causal paths (to nonoccurrence of Y) gives
The likelihood function becomes
(3) It is, of course, possible to complicate matters: one might hypothesize that k independent variables have an additive effect via the same causal path at the same time that other independent variables are having an effect via different causal paths. If so, the generalized likelihood function 15 becomes
2 du. This, of course, is simply a probit curve. I should emphasize that functions other than probit or logit curves could just as easily be used. Logit and probit are bounded by 0 and 1, making them ideal for the estimation of probabilities. The only drawback is the requirement that 0 < px 1 < 1 and 0 < px 2 < 1; though this requirement is usually unproblematic in practice, if need be the researcher can utilize other functions that are free of it, such as the Burr distribution (see Aldrich and Nelson (1984, 31-35) ).
15 At this point, the x ijk notation may befuddle even the most careful reader. As a reminder, the i subscript refers to the observation number, the j subscript refers to the causal path along which the variable exerts an effect, and the k subscript refers to the order of the variables within a given path. So, x 612 refers to the sixth observation on the second independent variable that is hypothesized to have an effect via the first causal path. The summation symbol may seem odd to large-N methodologists, who are more accustomed to the simpler Φ(βX) notation introduced later in the paper; I beg their indulgence here in the interests of clarity. Figure 1 illustrates this functional form. The figure corresponds to the logic of the falling-piano example: Guildenstern is in danger (Y , representing the probability of being killed, is high) only when the probability that Rosencrantz will choose a banana for lunch, Φ(α 1 + β 1 X 1 ), and the probability that Rosencrantz will select a frayed rope, Φ(α 2 + β 2 X 2 ), are high. As X 1 decreases, so does the marginal impact of changes in X 2 on Y , and vice-versa.
I should emphasize that there is nothing controversial about this model. In fact, although its use in political science is exceedingly rare, 16 it is a straightforward bivariate probit model with partial observability-a technique with a respectable pedigree in economics and econometrics (Abowd and Farber 1982; Greene 2000) .
17 Perhaps because it is only touched on in most texts and is 16 Although related models in which one dependent variable is observed if and only if the other takes on a given range of values have come into vogue recently, simple bivariate probit models with a single dependent variable in the political science literature are extremely uncommon-let alone tri-or n-variate models. Exceptions to this generalization include Przeworski and Vreeland (2002) , who utilize bivariate probit with partial observability, and Reed (2000) , who utilizes a variant designed for use with censored data.
17 It is worth noting that Abowd and Farber's variant of the bivariate probit model was developed to capture a situation in labor economics in which the assumption of little or no interdimensional correlation (ρ ∼ = 0) is a plausible one. Such an assumption may be unjustifiable under some circumstances-for example, in game-theoretic random utility models occasionally ignored, 18 the applicability of this technique to cases of multiple conjunctural causation has escaped the notice of political scientists, despite the fact that-as the derivation demonstrates-it is ideally suited to testing such theories.
Still, conjunctural causation is only part of the story: bivariate probit with partial observability is essentially a special case of the more general Boolean probit model. In the next sections I utilize the same method-working from logic to probability calculus to statistical equation-to derive entirely new tests of theories that posit complex causation.
Substitutability
Modeling a process of substitutability is mathematically slightly more complex, but it still follows directly from intuition. Here we need: 1. to model the probabilities that each of the relevant causal factors will not occur and then 2. to substract the product of those probabilities from 1 to obtain the overall probability that the event in question will occur.
To see this point, imagine that Rosencrantz has been convicted of probabilistic manslaughter. In view of the nature of the offense, the punishment is probabilistic as well: he is sentenced to face a firing squad consisting of two expert marksmen, each of whom is given a six-chambered revolver and a single bullet. When the appointed hour arrives he is tied to a pole, blindfolded, and given a cigarette. At the commandant's order the marksmen load their weapons, spin the barrels Russian Roulette-style, take aim, and fire. This is an example of substitutability.
19 Either of the bullets would bring about his death independently of the other. Though it may not seem obvious at first glance, each pull of the trigger decreases the marginal causal impact of the other: given that the first bullet alone would kill Rosencrantz, and that Rosencrantz cannot be killed more than once, the second bullet would produce no additional effect.
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in which joint observation by the actors of real-world factors that are relevant to utility but that are not captured in the econometric equation imply that error terms will be correlated (Smith 1999) . Under such circumstances the Poirier (1980) variant, in which ρ is estimated, is to be preferred.
18 Schmidt (1984) , in his review of the first edition of Maddala (1994) , refers to the book's coverage as "encyclopedic" but then takes it to task for its scant coverage of a handful of topics, one of which is Poirier's paper on partial observability in bivariate probit models.
19 In fact, it is an example that is often utilized. See Good (1985) , cited in Salmon (1998, 239-240) ; Salmon develops the probabilistic variant, while Good's is deterministic (no chambers are left empty).
20 It is worth mentioning that, for this reason, the deterministic version of redundant causation (six chambers, six bullets) can be problematic for counterfactual causal analyses (à la Tetlock and Belkin (1996) ): there is no doubt that one bullet would be sufficient to cause Rosencrantz's death, but subtracting either one of the two from the situation produces no change in the result. It would be a mistake, of course, to conclude that individual bullets What is the probability that Rosencrantz will be shot? An abstract model of such a situation, straight out of first-year statistic books, is rolling dice: if we throw two dice in an attempt to roll at least one 6, for example, there are two "paths" to rolling a 6, each one corresponding to one of the dice. Obviously, the probability of rolling at least one 6 when throwing more than one die is not obtained simply by adding up the probabilities of rolling a 6 on each die; otherwise, the probability of rolling at least one 6 when throwing seven dice would equal 7 6 . Rather, the probability is obtained by multiplying together the probability of not rolling a 6 (that is, 1 − 1 6 ) on each roll and subtracting the total from 1:
Therefore, though he may find little solace in the fact, Rosencrantz has nearly a 70% probability of surviving if each marksman fires once and only once. In more general terms, substitutability calculations take the form
We can use the same logic to derive from the general probability calculus the probability that the outcome in question will occur in the ith observation:
Generalizing to J causal paths (to occurrence of the dependent variable) gives
where the j subscript again distinguishes among different causal paths. The likelihood function is then derived from this probability precisely as it was in Equations 2-4. Figure 2 , which illustrates this functional form, reflects the logic of Rosencrantz's fate at the hands of his probabilistic firing squad. The probability that he will be killed is high (Y approaches 1) if the probability that either executioner's gun will fire is high (X 1 or X 2 is high) but is low otherwise. At the same time, he cannot be killed twice, even if both executioners' weapons are virtually certain to discharge. Boolean probit conforms to these expectations.
have no causal impact on their targets' health. Kiser and Levi (1996, 196-197) briefly mention problems associated with counterfactuals in the context of conjunctural causation. 
Combinations and permutations
It is possible to model more complex causal phenomena by simply extending the logic outlined above. The most straightforward example would be a combination of the two examples already given-to wit, given that we know all of the probabilities before Rosencrantz even leaves home, what is the probability that both Rosencrantz and Guildenstern will end up dead?
The death of both men requires a banana peel, a frayed rope, and at least one executioner's bullet. Here, one case of substitutability (one of the two guns must fire) and one case of conjunctural causation (the banana peel and the frayed rope must be present) are embedded within a larger instance of conjunctural causation (Rosencrantz and Guildenstern must both be killed for the condition of interest to be realized).
The known probabilities mentioned previously yield a simple answer:
-or about 3.4%. The procedure for generalizing to a situation in which probabilities are unknown but can be modeled as functions of sets of independent variables is precisely the same in this situation as it was in the previous ones. If we use p x1 to denote the probability that Rosencrantz will choose a banana, p x2 to denote the probability that Rosencrantz will choose a frayed rope, p x3 to denote the probability that the first executioner's gun will fire and p x4 to denote the probability that the second executioner's gun will fire, p y (the probability that both Rosencrantz and Guildenstern will end up dead) can be calculated as
Parameterization is substantially more complex but, as before, flows directly from the logic of the example. Using l and m to denote secondary causal paths and additive variables (analogous to j and k, respectively), we have:
The likelihood function can then be drawn up in precisely the same manner as the previous likelihood functions and maximized to produce parameter estimates.
More examples would be pointless, as the basic principle should now be clear: if a theorist attempts to explain the occurrence of an event in the language of complex causation, the resulting hypotheses should be capable of expression in terms of a basic probability calculus. A likelihood function can then be derived and maximized to produce Boolean probit (or logit) estimates. There is, in principle, no limit to how convoluted either procedure could become, although in practice the so-called "curse of dimensionality" will place increasingly high demands on the data as the number of dimensions increases.
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In the next section I use these insights and techniques to solve a long-standing puzzle in the study of international security: the curious disjuncture between theory and statistical evidence in the deterrence literature that relates capabilities and resolve to conflict.
The Puzzle: Capabilities, Resolve, and Conflict
The idea that conflict occurs when at least one party possesses both the capabilities and the willingness to initiate it is one of the most durable intuitions in the field of international relations. Generally, "capabilities" is used to refer to the ability to engage in military conflict with a reasonable chance of success, while "willingness" refers to the importance of the issues at stake to the state in question. 22 Thomas Schelling devoted the first two chapters of his seminal Arms and Influence (1966) to the topics of capabilities ("The Diplomacy of Violence") and willingness ("The Art of Commitment"). The two concepts 21 Bellman (1961) was, to my knowledge, the first to use this phrase, though it has now become quite common. It refers here to the exponential growth, as n increases, of the number of regions in an n-dimensional dataspace that must contain data if all parameters are to be estimated. Simple crosstabulation provides a clear illustration: 2 × 2 crosstabs require data in four regions (squares); 2 × 2 × 2 crosstabs require data in eight regions; and so on.
22 "Willingness" and "resolve" are often used interchangeably; I prefer the former because the latter is also used to refer to the outcome of the decision process to which capabilities and willingness are inputs.
are built in to the literature on expected utility and war: the probability of victory or defeat is directly related to capabilities, positive or negative utility determines whether or not a state is willing to fight, and expected utility is typically expressed as their product (Bueno de Mesquita 1981) . Game theorists focus primarily on willingness-and in particular the problem of commitment, or conveying willingness credibly (Morrow 1999 )-, though both capabilities and willingness permeate the rationalist literature on war. Even George and Smoke (1974) , who critique the rationalist literature on deterrence, cannot escape the centrality of willingness and capabilities, which appear as the first and third factors listed (respectively) in their reformulation of deterrence theory (523-531). At times, terminology hides the pervasiveness of the two concepts; to Most and Starr (1989) , for example, capabilities would be a form of "opportunity."
Curiously, however, the quantitative literature has largely avoided explicit tests of this formulation-so much so that, in Geller and Singer's (1998) booklength summary of quantitative studies of war, capabilities and "status quo orientation" (the nearest thing to willingness) occupy entirely separate sections (pp. 68-76 and 89-92, respectively) . 23 The few tests that have been conducted often report results that are either inconsistent or at odds with intuition: either one of the two elements plays a disproportionately small role in determining outcomes, or one is found not to matter at all. Balance of capabilities is found to be only partially relevant (immediate balance of forces matters, long-term balance doesn't) to the question of conflict initiation in both Huth and Russett (1984) and Huth (1988) , for example, but are found to be entirely irrelevant in Huth (1996) . One might also expect, in cases of disputes, to find that the resulting settlement reflects the capabilities and interests of the actors involved (e.g. Fearon (1995) ), but this intuition is also unsupported by the quantitative literature: Maoz (1983) examines both capabilities and willingness as predictors of the outcomes of militarized interstate disputes and finds superior capabilities to be unrelated to dispute outcome. Perhaps because a wider variety of indicators are utilized, willingness tends to fare a bit better, but there are still significant discrepancies among studies regarding which indicators make a significant difference (see e.g. the different findings in Huth and Russett (1984) vs. Huth (1988) regarding the significance of military and economic ties between defender and protégé). Finally, although Bueno de Mesquita (1981) finds that his data support the claim that expected utility is necessary for war initiation "within the bounds of measurement error" (130), Braumoeller and Goertz (2000, 850-852) examine the measurement-error claim and find the conclusion to be problematic.
How can large-N findings be both so inconsistent and so at odds with both qualitative findings and theoretical logic? One possibility is that the theory is misspecified. This possibility is especially strong in studies of crises (or attempts at immediate deterrence), as opposed to those that examine the question of how states come to challenge deterrence commitments in the first place (the breakdown of general deterrence). The role of capabilities and willingness in the resolution of immediate deterrence situations is contested: while traditional rational deterrence theory suggests that both will be related to conflict initiation, game-theoretic formulations would support either a positive or null relationship between capabilities and escalation and a negative or null relationship between willingness and initiation (Fearon 1994a; Fearon 1994b) . By contrast, all accounts concur on the role of capabilities and willingness in the breakdown of general deterrence.
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These arguments render a valuable service by providing more explicit and detailed logic than had previously existed. Nevertheless, as the literature just cited demonstrates, these expectations are not realized in the small number of studies carried out to date. The positive relationship between capabilities and outcomes in immediate deterrence in Huth and Russett (1984) and Huth (1988) is inconsistent with Fearon (1994a) , and the absence of a positive relationship between capabilities and the breakdown of general deterrence in Huth (1996) is inconsistent with any expectations. Even the four indicators of willingness examined in Fearon's (1994b) reanalysis of Huth (1988) provide ambiguous results: two (trade and arms transfers) are positively correlated with the success of immediate deterrence and two (contiguity and alliances) are negatively correlated with the success of immediate deterrence. In no case does the ratio of coefficient to standard error inspire high levels of confidence. In short, the data presented thus far are quite often inconsistent with either traditional or game-theoretic expectations.
A more plausible answer, I believe, is that deterrence theory posits a relationship of complex causation that is not captured by the standard statistical procedures used to test it to date. In all of the studies listed above, variables representing capabilities and resolve are put into a standard additive equation.
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There are two reasons to find fault with a straightforward additive model. First, if either capabilities or willingness is absent, variations in the other should be irrelevant; only the conjuncture of the two should produce conflict. Second, as Huth (1996) points out, the willingness to engage in conflict can stem from multiple, substitutable sources. The logic of the theory therefore suggests both substitutability and conjunctural causation. The functional forms of the econometric tests used to evaluate it do not reflect either expectation.
Resolving the puzzle
In attempting to resolve this discrepancy I will utilize data from Huth (1996) , for three reasons. First, it is considerably more comprehensive than previous datasets and contains measures of a wider range of variables over a far larger 24 Fearon (1994a, 586) argues that "rational states will 'select themselves' into crises on the basis of observable measures of relative capabilities and interests and will do so in a way that neutralizes any subsequent impact of these measures, " and Fearon (1994b, 244-247) asserts that capabilities and willingness should be associated with the success or failure of general deterrence in a manner consistent with traditional rational deterrence theory.
25 The exception is Maoz, who bases his findings on both an additive multivariate analysis and separate bivariate analyses. Neither, however, is exempt from the criticism that follows. number of cases. Second, it explicitly examines the initiation and maintenance of territorial disputes, as distinct from the escalation of such disputes to war. It should, therefore, be relatively uncontroversial to scholars in the rational deterrence school: traditional deterrence theory and the more recent game-theoretic literature agree on the sources of general deterrence failures (see footnote 24), though the same cannot be said of failures of immediate deterrence. Finally, it is an explicit attempt to combine realist and domestic theories of conflict, and for that reason it can illustrate the utility of the technique for the purpose of theory synthesis.
Huth examines territorial disputes in an attempt to determine why states initiate or maintain territorial claims. Faced with competing answers (realist versus domestic politics) to this question, Huth incorporates insights from both schools into a larger explanation. In his words, he seeks to "rethink a realist approach by focusing specifically on the impact of domestic politics in the formation of the security policy of states. " (p. 16) In order to do so, Huth divides his independent variables into three categories: issues at stake, international context, and domestic context. He then runs a standard logit analysis with variables from all three categories as independent variables and bases his conclusions on the significance (or lack of it) of the individual variables. Briefly, the findings suggest four things: that the association of certain issues (strategic value, e.g.) with a particular piece of territory increases the probability that a state will advance a claim to it; that such a claim is also made more likely in the presence of a host of domestic contextual variables; that factors defining the international context tend to make such claims less likely to occur; and finally, as an exception to the last generalization, that the balance of military forces does not exert an effect one way or the other on the probability that the state will forward or maintain a territorial claim. (The analysis is replicated in Table 3.) Huth's hypotheses are linear and additive, so the test is appropriate given the hypotheses. At the same time, however, the argument contains subtleties that are not reflected in the hypotheses. First of all, balance of forces is unlikely to play a role similar to that played by the other variables. Systemic or domestic factors provide the willingness to forward a claim, whereas greater capabilities provide the ability to do so. 26 Huth expresses this distinction directly when he notes that modified realism portrays leaders as limiting the threat or use of military power to international disputes where politically salient issues are at stake and the costs of military conflict are not substantial.
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The fact that claims are likely to be forwarded only when states have both the capabilities and willingness to do so suggests an overarching process of Table 3 : Replication of original analysis conjunctural causation. If we use p c to denote the probability that the leadership believes that it is capable of making a difference and p w to denote the probability that the state is willing to begin a dispute, the first point suggests that the probability of a dispute will be high when leaders both perceive an incentive to act and possess the ability to do so:
Second, willingness to engage in conflict can arise from either domestic or international sources. The heart of Huth's "modified realism" is the insight that states can be prompted either by domestic incentives or by systemic incentives to become involved in a dispute:
[S]tate leaders must juggle two critical political roles: (1) they are held accountable for preserving the national security of their country, and (2) they are politicians who seek to remain in power and thus are concerned with current or potential political opposition from counterelites.
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Therefore, system-and domestic-level incentives should exhibit substitutability: either should, independently of the other, be able to provide the impetus for conflict. If we use p di to denote the probability that domestic audiences will perceive an incentive to initiate a dispute and p si to denote the probability that leaders will perceive such an incentive for systemic reasons, the second point suggests that either domestic or systemic factors can provide the willingness to act:
Substituting the right-hand side of equation 11 into equation 10 yields the overall calculation:
That is: A dispute is likely to be initiated and maintained if the state is able to effect a change in the status quo and the state desires (either for traditional realpolitik reasons or for the purpose of pleasing domestic audiences) to do so. This logic in turn suggests a recategorization of the relevant independent variables. The variable most relevant to the state's ability to effect a change in the status quo, obviously, is the balance of military forces. As to the issues at stake, it is difficult to offer a perfectly clear delineation between issues that would prompt a response for systemic reasons and those that would be salient to a domestic audience. Nevertheless, we can start by thinking about which variables should matter most from the point of view of traditional realpolitik. Obviously, the strategic location of a particular piece of territory qualifies, as does the existence of a common alliance. Perhaps not as obviously, the existence of a previous settlement qualifies as well because of the state's desire to avoid the reputation costs involved in going back on its word.
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On the other hand, the remaining issues seem most likely to be important because of their salience to a domestic audience. Ties to bordering minorities are obviously considerably more important for their domestic implications than for their effect on the strategic calculus of leaders, as are calls for political unification. Prior gains and losses of territory and prior unresolved disputes would be viewed by strict realpolitik ers as sunk costs (or benefits); their primary importance would be to disgruntled populations (e.g., Alsace-Lorraine). Finally, whether or not the issue is seen as relevant to the issue of decolonization in light of the substantial post-World War II decolonization norm may make domestic audiences more sympathetic to intervention, but again, its relevance from a purely systemic point of view is negligible.
One issue, the economic value of the territory in question, could reasonably provide incentives for conflict for either systemic or domestic reasons: economic strength is one dimension of a state's overall capabilities, and economically valuable territory is desirable to domestic audiences capable of capitalizing on its resources. 30 Here we see another advantage of Boolean techniques: because independent variables from one dimension are not simply added to independent 29 Huth makes precisely this argument on p. 59. 30 The author is explicitly agnostic on this point; see Huth (1996, 52) .
Dependent variable:
Initiation or maintenance of claim implying territorial dispute.
Independent variables:
Original Model Boolean Logit Symbols Table 4 : Original categorization of variables (Huth 1996) and recategorization for Boolean logit analysis.
variables from another dimension, the same variable can be included in more than one dimension without inducing perfect multicollinearity. Therefore, it is possible to ascertain whether a territory's economic value matters to decisionmakers for systemic or domestic reasons (or both) by including the variable in both dimensions. These insights point to the recategorization scheme laid out in Table 4 . Now that the revised theory has been laid out, a likelihood function must be derived from the basic logic of the theory. Two initial difficulties must be addressed. First, utilizing the notation used so far would produce a monstrous function. In the hopes that doing so will aid intuition more than hinder it, I will denote the constant as β j0 rather than α j and introduce an abbreviated form βX jk ,
which should make the overall logic of the likelihood function considerably easier to see. Second, Huth utilizes logit rather than probit analysis in his hypothesis test because his sampling rate varies depending on the value of the dependent variable and, while logit coefficients remain consistent under those circumstances, probit coefficients do not. 31 Therefore, Boolean logit rather than probit should be used here. The derivation is precisely the same, save that Φ(βX) is replaced by e βX 1+e βX . Generalizing from the logic in equation 12,
1+e βX 1k
Accordingly,
The likelihood function then becomes
1 + e βX 1k
1 + e Maximizing this likelihood function yields the results given in Table 5 .
Results
The results of the Boolean logit analysis call into question some of the main findings from the simple additive model. Balance of forces, originally deemed irrelevant based on the simple logit model, proves to have a highly significant effect on initiation or maintenance of a territorial claim in conjunction with either systemic or domestic incentives to make such a claim. At the same time, ties to a bordering minority and the presence of the question of political unification both exert a negative influence on the domestic audience's willingness to press a territorial claim; the first variable was found to be insignificant in the original study and the second was found to exert a significant and positive effect on the probability of conflict. The latter finding suggests that domestic audiences are on average more willing to press a claim for territory when they feel no affinity for those from whom it is to be taken (and who might have to be shot if that claim is to be realized). Discussing the substantive impact of changes in independent variables on the dependent variable can be a bit more complex when Boolean probit and logit techniques are used, but it is hardly impossible. Figure 3 provides four examples. Each demonstrates how the probability of initiation or maintenance of a dispute varies as a function of balance of forces when a particular independent variable is either absent or present and the remainder are held at their mean values. Moving from upper-left to lower-right demonstrates that some variables have a considerably larger substantive impact on dispute behavior than do others under these circumstances: while prior gain of territory is virtually irrelevant, the presence of a prior unresolved dispute can increase the probability of a dispute by nearly 8%.
The ability to model the economic value of the territory as both a systemic and domestic incentive has a very clear payoff: while its effects as a systemic incentive are quite significant statistically, the ratio of coefficient to standard Figure 3 : Predicted probabilities of dispute (Y-axis) given balance of forces (X-axis) and changes in (from upper left to lower right) prior gain of territory, strategic location of territory, prior loss of territory, and prior unresolved dispute; changes are from absence of causal factor (lighter lines) to presence (darker lines).
error suggests quite strongly that its effects as a domestic incentive are virtually nil. Put more precisely, the results suggest that the economic value of a piece of territory contributes substantially to an additive measure of systemic willingness but contributes little if anything to an additive measure of domestic willingness. This sort of conclusion was simply not possible in the original study because of the methodology employed.
The results also highlight the effects of the so-called curse of dimensionality. One variable, prior settlement of dispute, exhibits the classic symptom of underidentification: a grossly inflated standard error. The evidence of underidentification can be found by holding all coefficients but one constant at their values at convergence, varying the coefficient for one of the variables, plotting its value against the model's overall log-likelihood, and looking for plateaus in the likelihood function. Figure 4 demonstrates that such a plateau is not only present but pronounced for the prior settlement variable. (An example of a variable for which underidentification is not a problem, balance of forces, is provided for comparison.) 32 32 See King (1989, 192-193) for a discussion of plateaus in likelihood functions. Note that the only real "fix" for this problem is to gather more data. This problem occurs here because evaluating theories that posit causal complexity requires what for lack of a better term I will call complex covariation: there must be enough cases in the critical regions of a multiply-partitioned dataspace to permit inference. In this example, despite the fact that there are 8,328 overall observations, the high balance of forces / high domestic willingness category 33 contains too few cases of prior settlement (to be exact, four) to permit reliable inferences to be drawn regarding its effects on conflict initiation.
34 Evaluating multiple causal path theories hinges critically on complex covariation, regardless of sample size. This is a feature of reality, not of the model-it holds regardless of the particular methodology used. Boolean probit and logit techniques correctly alert the user to the fact that the number of cases in a particular category is too low to permit inference.
Finally, one of Huth's main objectives was to combine realism and theories of domestic politics. As Moravcsik (1997, 542) writes, If foreign policymaking is a process of constrained choice by purposive states, a view shared by realist, institutionalist, and liberal theory, there may well be cases in which a combination of preferences and constraints shapes state behavior. In such cases, a multicausal synthesis, one that treats these theories not as substitutes but as complements, is required [emphasis in original].
One of the main theoretical advantages of modeling complex causation is that it facilitates this sort of synthesis. Implicit in the original additive formulation is the notion that a unit decrease in x 1 can be counteracted by a β1 β2 -unit increase in x 2 : any two variables are functionally interchangeable. In the revised formulation, no such assumption is made across variables derived from different theories. The nature of the variables' interaction is clearly-and theoretically-33 That is, balance of forces > > 0.5. 34 All variables except balance of forces are binary-a fact that aggravates identification problems considerably.
specified. The level of constraint is determined by relative capabilities; preference stems either from traditional realpolitik goals or from domestic audience incentives; and only the combination (conjuncture) of constraint and preference determines outcomes.
Conclusion
Causal complexity is an ideal problem for statistical methodology to tackle because of its broad applicability and utility. The solution provided here is designed specifically to deal with the peculiar empirical implications of complexity, and as such it adds a prominent new weapon to our collective methodological arsenal.
The details of the procedure itself, however, should not obscure the broader message: the full potential of quantitative methodology-or of any methodology, for that matter-in the study of politics can only be realized if theoretical logic rather than convention drives the selection, and if necessary the creation, of appropriate methods. Separatism, or even antagonism, among methodological subfields ill serves this goal, especially when genuine accommodation is possible. Indeed, by combining their contributions we may find that the whole is greater than the sum of the parts.
